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Financing Peace: Special Autonomy Fund as a Peace 
Dividend in Aceh, Indonesia 
 
Amalia Sustikarini   University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the peacebuilding process in Aceh Indonesia. Southeast Asia is one 
of the regions that has been plagued by severe ethno-nationalist strives due to its high 
level of diversity and the impact of colonialism. Among several cases of ethno-nationalist 
struggles in this region, the separatist insurgency in Aceh, Indonesia has been regarded 
as the protracted conflict that has been successfully resolved and created durable peace. 
The Helsinki Peace Agreement attempted to redress the economic grievances that were 
manifested in perceived inequality and the exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources 
through the arrangement of Special Autonomy Fund. This fund serves as a peace 
dividend that is expected to bring welfare and enhance economic development in Aceh. 
The paper examines the role of Special Autonomy Fund in accelerating economic 
development in Aceh in the past ten years by utilizing the concept of the peace dividend 
and the model of fiscal-sharing. While this fund has been successfully increasing Aceh, 
economic growth compared to the conflict era, it has not been optimally utilized to reduce 
poverty and inequality. Due to the nature of peace in Aceh as an elite-based peace, the 
peace dividend has contributed to the patronage politics particularly among the former 
combatants. 
Key words: Southeast Asia Insurgencies, Peacebuilding, Aceh, Special Autonomy 
Fund, Economic Grievances, Peace Dividend 
 
Introduction  
Southeast Asia is one of the 
regions that has long been plagued by 
separatist conflict. This type of conflict is 
described by Weller (2005, pp. 4) as 
“among the most damaging and 
protracted to have bedeviled states and 
the international system since 1945”.  
Reilly and Graham (2004) argue that the 
weakness of Asia-Pacific countries 
towards internal insurgencies is caused by 
the vulnerable state structures which deal 
with identity-based conflict insurgencies. 
Due to the impact of colonialism, many 
states in Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific are artificial creations of the 
twentieth century, incorporating diverse 
ethnicities, races or religious group 
without strong cohesion (Reilly & 
Graham, 2004). Among several Southeast 
Asian countries, Indonesia, Thailand and 
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the Philippines are the homes of the 
longest ethno-nationalist insurgencies.  
Indonesia provides an appealing 
case study of ethno-nationalist insurgency 
as well as its successful resolution. Aceh, 
the westernmost province of Indonesia, is 
known for its long history of war, 
resistance, and rebellion. The longest post-
independence insurgency in Aceh 
commenced in the midst of increasing 
centralism of Suharto’s New Order 
government. In December 1976, Tengku 
Muhammad Hasan di Tiro or known as 
Hasan Tiro established Aceh-Sumatra 
National Liberation Front (ASNLF) which 
was later renamed Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM). Hasan Tiro 
is the descendant of a prominent 
Acehnese family and the grandson of 
Teuku Cik Di Tiro, an Indonesia national 
hero during the struggle against Dutch 
colonialism (Schulze, 2004). Grievances 
over center-periphery antagonism, 
economic-natural resources distribution, 
political participation and cultural 
acknowledgement fueled the mobilization 
organized by GAM. 
The central government responded 
to this rebellion by launching a series of 
counterinsurgency operations that caused 
extensive casualties, widespread human 
right violations and heightened the scale 
of the conflict. Many years later in 1998, 
Suharto fell from power. This was 
followed by dramatic changes in the 
overall Indonesian political landscape, 
including the way the government dealt 
with internal conflict. Under President 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, two efforts towards a 
peaceful resolution in Aceh were initiated 
under the facilitation of the Henry Dunant 
Center. In May 2000, the Government of 
Indonesia and GAM agreed to sign a 
cease-fire agreement, the Humanitarian 
Pause, followed by a Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement in December 2002. 
Neither agreement lasted very long, 
owing to unsatisfied demands between 
GAM and the Government of Indonesia 
regarding the issue of Aceh’s 
independence. 
In December 2004, Aceh was hit by 
a calamitous earthquake and tsunami 
which caused more fatalities. According to 
data from the International Recovery 
Platform, there were 16,389 people dead, 
and 532,898    displaced (International 
Recovery Platform, 2004). In the aftermath 
of the tsunami, a historic agreement 
between Aceh Rebel Movement (Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka or GAM) and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(GoI) was signed in Helsinki, Finland on 
15 August 2005.  This peace agreement 
was mediated by Martti Ahtisaari, former 
president of Finland, under the auspice of 
Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).  Since 
the peace agreement was signed in 2005, 
peace in Aceh has been maintained for 13 
years, former combatants have secured 
seats in Parliament and the Executive 
branch of government. Economic 
indicators have gradually improved, and 
development projects are robust. 
In the aftermath of conflict, the 
economic condition in Aceh has gradually 
improved as shown in table 1. From 
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conflict period in 2004-2005 to peacetime 
in 2006-2007, economic growth in Aceh 
rocketed from 1.8 and 1.2 per cent to 7.7 
and 7.4 per cent, respectively. Negative 
growth in 2008 and 2009 indicated the 
impact of the depleting oil reserves in 
Aceh coupled with the diminishing 
construction and rehabilitation sectors 
(Bank Indonesia, 2009). In 2015, the 
negative growth was instigated by the 
discontinuation of the operation of Arun 
Gas Company that produces condensate 
and liquid natural gas (Medan Bisnis 
Daily, 2016). 
Table 1. Aceh Economic Growth 2004-
2017 
Year  With Oil 
and Gas  
Without Oil 
and Gas  
2004  -9.6  1.8 
2005 -10.1 1,2 
2006 1.6 7.7 
2007 -2.5 7.4 
2008 -8,3 1.9 
2009 -3.82 3.78 
2010 2.79 5.49 
2011 5.02 5.89 
2012 5.21 6.09 
2013 4.82 5.45 
2014 2.71 4.02 
2015 -0.72 4.34 
2016 3.31 4.31 
2017 4.19 4.14  
Source: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau) 
Table 2. Aceh GDP Per Capita 2007-2017 
Year  With Oil 
and Gas  
(In USD)  
Without Oil 
and Gas  
(In USD) 
2007 1.684,90 1.178,31 
2008 1.705,60 1.601,07 
2009 1.633,66 1.336,84 
2010 1.760,97 1.468,62 
2011 1.914,05 1.599,36 
2012 2.034,72 1.714,83 
2013 2.012,00 1.714.00 
2014 2.193,63 1.971,61 
2015 1.927,16 1.852,34 
2016 2.024,33 1.961,90 
2017 2.112,15 2.043,57 
Source: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau) 
Table 2 shows the Gross Domestic 
Product per capita in Aceh more than one 
decade after the peace settlement that 
reaches approximately around USD 2100 
per year with oil and gas and USD 2000 
without oil and gas in 2017. Before peace, 
GDP per capita in Aceh was recorded at 
USD 1090 with oil and gas in 2004 (World 
Bank, 2006). While the Aceh’s GDP is 
catching up due to the growth, in the 
same year in 2007 Aceh was one of the 
poorest Indonesian provinces ranked at 
sixth lowest among 33 provinces with 
16,89% of those in Aceh living below the 
poverty line of US$ 34/ months (BPS). 
Aceh Peace Process is considered 
as one of the most successful and durable 
peace processes in the world (Djuli, 2018). 
The model of peace settlement in Aceh has 
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inspired other countries in Southeast Asia 
that also experience separatist 
insurgencies such as The Philippines and 
Thailand. One primary aspect of the peace 
process in Aceh that was partially 
followed by The Philippines Government 
to resolve the conflict in the Mindanao, 
Southern Philippines is the economic 
settlement. Since perceived inequality is 
one of the primary causes of conflict in 
Aceh, the narrative about economic 
exploitation and unequal sharing of 
natural resources between the central 
government and the province of Aceh has 
fueled grievances over the years. 
Therefore, post-conflict peacebuilding in 
Aceh is directed to addressing these 
grievances by redistributing the revenue 
from the national budget and natural 
resources through a national budget that 
aims to enhance Aceh’s economic 
independence, supporting economic 
growth and social welfare. This 
arrangement is duplicated by The 
Philippines Government through The Law 
of Bangsamoro or BOL. In BOL, The 
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao will receive annual 
block grant, the increasing share in 
revenue taxes and natural resources taxes 
and rehabilitation fund for ten years 
(Marcelo, 2018). 
Against this backdrop, this paper 
seeks to analyze the role of special 
autonomy fund as a peace dividend to 
address a (perceived) economic 
inequalities that fueled the conflict in 
Aceh over thirty years. The paper argues 
that within ten years of the disbursement 
of special autonomy fund, this peace 
dividend has not yet yielded the expected 
result in alleviating economic deprivation 
in Aceh. It occurs due to the lack of skill 
from the former combatants that dominate 
local government and the type of peace in 
Aceh that tends to be an elite-based, 
exacerbated by the patron-client network 
that is sustained from the reconstruction 
period to peacetime.   
The Special Autonomy Fund (SAF) as 
Peace Dividend in Aceh 
Peace dividends are the crucial 
part of the peacebuilding process as stated 
by the 2009 Report of the Secretary-
General on Peacebuilding in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. The 
report stated, “that if countries can deliver 
early peace dividends, build confidence in 
the political process, and strengthen core 
national capacity early on, they can reduce 
the risk of relapse into conflict and 
substantially increase the chances for 
sustainable peace”. 
The term "peace dividend" has 
significantly different meanings at 
different levels of analysis. Peace dividend 
is commonly understood as the reduction 
defense budget to increase the fund to 
finance non-defense spending such as 
education, health and poverty reduction. 
O’Hearn (2000) classified the literature on 
peace dividends based on three major 
streams. The majority of studies on the 
peace dividend analyze the impact of the 
reduction of conflict such as cold war to 
the level of dividends accepted by the 
militarized regions. Smaller literature 
examines the benefit of the military 
expenditure transfer to the non-defense 
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purpose or to avoid the destruction of war. 
The minor literature on peace dividends 
analyses the effects of peace on peripheral 
regions or on communities that have been 
in conflict with regionally powerful states. 
These communities have been 
experiencing political marginalization and 
economic disenfranchisement that create a 
fertile ground for armed conflict. Hence, 
peace dividends give these communities a 
promise of greater economic participation 
and development in terms of trade, 
investment and entrepreneurship. 
Chan (1995) categorized peace 
dividends into the three steps: firstly, the 
reduction of military expenditure to 
generate nontrivial saving (resource 
dividend) and secondly by the promotion 
of greater production efficiency (product 
dividend). The last step is the direct 
transfer of defense saving to increase the 
budget for the social program and an 
indirect one by creating a healthier 
economy. The other form of the peace 
dividend is fiscal power sharing. Fiscal 
sharing is focused on the politics of peace 
dividends to generate an equal share of 
fiscal resources by reducing the 
proportion of central government and 
allocating a bigger share to local 
government (Aleman & Treisman, 2005). 
The impact of fiscal decentralization on 
secessionist violence will depend on the 
true motives of those demanding 
secession. According to Aleman and 
Treisman (2005), there are three common 
motives for secession: autonomists, 
opportunities and local ethnic 
entrepreneurs. Autonomists aim to win 
greater authority to build local entities 
within existing states. Opportunists extort 
bigger shares of national wealth, while 
local ethnic entrepreneur demands 
independence to gain local support 
(Aleman & Treisman, 2005 pp. 176-177). 
Therefore, the result of peace dividend to 
generate welfare to the community will 
depend on the leader of the separatist 
movement, whether it will be well utilized 
for the society or being manipulated for 
the leader’s benefit. 
The importance of fiscal sharing is 
acknowledged by scholars in the 
consociationalism school as it is argued by 
(Lipjhart, 1973; 1993 pp. 188-189 as cited in 
Aleman & Treisman, 2005 pp. 177): 
“Proportionality in the allocation of public 
funds is an essential element of successful 
power sharing arrangement among ethnic 
groups”. The central transfer to the most 
likely separatist region is also considered 
an effective strategy to prevent secession 
(Roeder & Rotschild, 2005). 
In addition to fiscal sharing, peace 
dividends could also be based on natural 
wealth sharing.  Onder & Cordela (2016) 
state that natural oil revenue-sharing in 
post-conflict areas would generate various 
result. This scheme works in Aceh because 
fiscal decentralization was part of the 
peace agreement between The 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Free Aceh Movement in 2005. It 
did not work for Colombia Civil War 
resolution as 1991 fiscal reforms led to the 
appropriation of revenue by the rebel 
group to finance the movement. In Iraq, 
the result is mixed. Temporarily, oil 
revenue sharing between Iraq and 
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Kurdistan Regional Government might 
preserve Iraq territorial sovereignty, but 
in the long run, it could strengthen the 
Peshmerga fighters in their bid for 
independence (Onder & Cordela, 2016).  
The subject of fiscal politics as 
peace dividend is crucial in post-conflict 
peacebuilding especially in sub-national 
conflict since the central government 
tends to allocate a large number of funds 
to redress the imbalance of the 
distribution of natural wealth during the 
conflict. As it was mentioned earlier, the 
impact of the distribution of the peace 
dividend will depend on the motives of 
separatism. It may generate optimal 
welfare for the wider public and alleviate 
grievances or will end up benefiting 
certain groups of elites who belong to one 
ethnic group. Thus, unless managed 
fairly, a peace dividend may contribute to 
the possibility of the repetition of internal 
colonialism, in which one group tends to 
exploit resources at the expense of the 
other. 
Unlike the traditional literature of 
peace dividends that links the reduction 
of military spending to economic 
development, the concept of peace 
dividends in Aceh is closer to fiscal and 
natural wealth sharing. Fiscal and natural 
revenue sharing are the important aspects 
of Aceh’s economic development as a 
mean to alleviate economic grievances 
that fueled the conflict. The imbalance of 
the past unfair distribution of Aceh’s 
natural wealth is being alleviated by 
granting a large amount peace fund which 
is expected to accelerate economic 
development in Aceh and can bring 
welfare to the Acehnese people. 
Aceh has received the Special 
Autonomy Fund since 2001, but the 
amount was increased as a result of the 
peace settlement. Peace dividend in Aceh 
consists of the Natural Resource Revenue 
Sharing Fund (Dana Bagi Hasil Sumber 
Daya Alam/DBH SDA), in which Aceh 
gains a bigger percentage (70 per cent) of 
oil and gas compared to other provinces. 
This fund is also called the “Additional 
Oil and Gas Profit Sharing Fund” in article 
182 of LoGA (Law on The Governing of 
Aceh). This provision is an effort to 
redress the grievance about the imbalance 
of the profit sharing from oil and gas 
which has been perceived by the majority 
of Acehnese as center-periphery economic 
exploitation. 
Figure 1 describes how LoGA 
regulates the utilization of the Natural 
Resources Revenue Sharing Fund, with 
Aceh’s government obtaining 55% from 
oil and 40% from gas. Thirty per cent of 
this fund must be allocated to education, 
and 70 per cent is granted to 
intergovernmental sharing (Islahudin, 
2010 pp. 4). 
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Figure 1. Allocation of Additional Revenue Sharing from Oil and Gas for District/City 
Government in Aceh 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
The other component of the peace 
dividend is the additional two per cent 
share of the General Allocation Fund 
(Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU) for 15 years. It 
will then continue at one more per cent for 
five more years until 2027, as shown in 
figure 5.3.  DAU is the new system of 
Indonesia’s inter-governmental transfer as 
defined in Law No 25/1999 on 
decentralization (Barr, Resosudarmo, 
Dermawan & McCarthy, 2006 pp. 65). 
According to Article 1, Law No 22/1999 
about decentralization, “this fund is 
allocated from the national government 
budget according to a specified formula 
with the objective of equalizing the 
financial capacity across regions to fund 
their respective expenditure within the 
context of implementing 
decentralization”. The additional 2 per 
cent share is an effort to redress the 
imbalance of previous decades of the 
distribution natural resources, as the oil 
and gas in Aceh is already in decline. To 
avoid a confusing word swap, these two 
schemes of peace dividend are called 
Special Autonomy Fund (Dana Otonomi 
Khusus-Dana Otsus). 
The utilization of the Special 
Autonomy Fund is regulated in Law of 
Governing Aceh (LoGA). It is aimed to 
finance the following development 
programs: 
1. Development and maintenance of 
infrastructure 
2. Economic empowerment of people 
3. Eradicating poverty 
4. Education 
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5. Social 
6. Health (Law of Governing Aceh, 
article 183). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Allocation of Special Autonomy Fund into City/District 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
Figure 3. Aceh Provincial and District’s Revenues 1999-2008 
 
Source: The World Bank (2011)
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From Figure 3 we can see that the 
Special Autonomy Fund had contributed 
significantly to Aceh’s provincial and 
district’s revenue. Aceh provincial and 
district revenue started to escalate and 
reached a peak in 2008 after the allocation 
of Special Autonomy Fund. Under 
Governor Irwandi’s administration, the 
committee was established to decide how 
to allocate oil Special Autonomy Fund. 
The allocation was articulated in the 
Government of Aceh Mid-Term 
Development Plan period 2007-2011 and 
set out as follows:  
(1) Strengthening of governance, 
political processes and the law 
(2) Economic empowerment, 
employment opportunities and 
poverty reduction 
(3) Development and maintenance of 
investments in infrastructure 
(4) Development of education that is 
of high quality and accessible 
(5) Increase in quality of health care 
services 
(6) Development of religion, society 
and culture 
(7) Disaster risk reduction and 
management. (Hillman, 2011 pp. 
537) 
Among the five priorities, 
education and health were the priorities of 
Governor Irwandi. During the election 
campaign, Irwandi promised to allocate a 
large proportion of the fund to these two 
sectors (Hillman, 2011). Irwandi’s policy 
echoes Collier (2006) argument about the 
importance of inclusive social 
expenditures such as expansion in 
primary health care and education for 
growth in post-conflict settings that are 
often deteriorating during the prolonged 
conflict. In other words, there is a need to 
put greater emphasis on social inclusion 
and hold macroeconomic and long-term 
policy (Hehn, 2011 pp. 294). The items in 
the planning were based on the 
stipulation in LoGA with some additions 
on disaster risk and governance, two 
important subjects for the development of 
Aceh in post-conflict. This section will 
focus on the disbursement of Aceh Special 
Autonomy Fund in infrastructure, health, 
and education. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is allotted the most 
significant share of the fund, with stark 
disparities in spending compared to other 
sectors such as economic development, 
education and health. According to the 
LoGA, infrastructure is one of the 
priorities to be financed by the Special 
Autonomy Fund. Between 2008 and 2010, 
infrastructure always received the biggest 
share of the fund. Most of the fund for 
infrastructure, 58%, is spent on road and 
bridge construction and maintenance. 
Allocation for irrigation is 11%, river 
conservation and flood control 9.8%, 
village infrastructure 8.7%, and housing 
6.6% (World Bank, 2011). 
However, from the survey 
conducted by the World Bank (World 
Bank, 2011) the level of satisfaction with 
infrastructure development is low 
compared to other sectors. The 
dissatisfaction occurred due to the poor 
quality of the construction and unfinished 
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projects. Another shortcoming of the 
infrastructure in Aceh is that most of the 
fund is allocated to small scale projects 
below IDR 200 million (approximately 
US$ 20,000). Based on Presidential Decree 
No 70/2012, the procurement of 
goods/construction works/others are set at 
the maximum of IDR 200,000,000.00 (two 
hundred million rupiahs) that be 
implemented through the direct 
appointment.  This regulation gives an 
opportunity to newly established and 
small contractor companies which only 
have the low skill to win projects, often 
through collusive practices that primarily 
occurred during post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
Small-scale projects such as 
building paving blocks or fences will not 
have a significant impact on the broader 
community.  Borrowing the term used by 
Muhammad Syarif (Jawa Post, n.d) 
development in Aceh is interest-based, not 
need-based. It is built to cater to political 
interests by creating patron-client 
networks rather than focusing on a long-
term development strategy to create 
welfare and stimulate economic growth.  
Education  
The importance of education in 
post-conflict development in Aceh is 
manifested in the 30% allocation for 
education fund in Additional Revenue 
Sharing from Oil and Gas and one of the 
sectors financed by Special Autonomy 
Fund. Until 2027, when Special Autonomy 
Fund is phased out, Aceh will receive IDR 
34, 7 trillion (USD 23 million) in education 
funding. One of the indicators of the 
progress of education is by measuring the 
Human Development Index (HDI). Aceh’s 
Human Development Index (HDI) was 
quite good in the past. Based on official 
statistics, in 1996 Aceh’s HDI was 69.4 
with it ranking 9th out of 26 Indonesian 
provinces while during the 2004-2010 
period, Aceh’s HDI gave the province a 
rank of 17-18th of 33 provinces (Barron, 
Rahmant & Nugroho, 2013). In 2016, 
Aceh’s HDI was steadily progressing and 
in the relatively same level with the 
national index (CMI, 2017).  
Figure 4. Aceh Human Development 
Index 2010-2016 
 
Source: CMI (2017) 
However, the vast amount for 
education in Aceh has not been properly 
and strategically allocated for increasing 
the quality of education.  As shown by 
Figure 5, the biggest proportion of the 
Special Autonomy Fund for the education 
sector was allocated to building 
classrooms and school fences, expenses 
that do not significantly contribute to the 
Aceh’s educational excellence. As 
mentioned earlier, such minor 
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construction projects are normally valued 
below IDR 200 million. Because 
government regulation does not require a 
tender process for the low-value project, 
the local government can employ direct 
appointment, a practice that is prone to 
patron-client network. 
Figure 5. Utilization of Special 
Autonomy Fund in Education Sector 
based on the type of expenses 2012 (In 
Percentage) 
 
Source: ACDP (2014) 
Figure 6.  The Utilization of Special 
Autonomy Fund in the Education Sector 
in Aceh Based on the Value of the 
Project 2013 (In Percentage) 
 
Source: ACDP (2014) 
Another landmark of the 
utilization of Special Autonomy Fund in 
Aceh is by the establishment of Aceh 
Scholarship Commission, an ambitious 
tertiary education program that sends 
Acehnese to study in prominent 
universities in Indonesia or overseas. 
From its commencement in 2009 to 2013, 
this program has spent a total of IDR 609 
Billion, sending 6031 scholarship 
recipients to pursue domestic or 
international postgraduate education 
(ACDP, 2014). This program is not free of 
problems. Lack of strategic analysis of 
scholarship has caused unemployability of 
the scholarship awardees upon their 
return in Aceh (Putri, 2018). Most 
recipients aspired to work in the public 
sector, partly due to the stagnation of the 
Aceh economy and lack of investment that 
leads to limited work opportunities. There 
is also a problem of misuse of scholarship 
funds by the recipient, which they spend 
it to non-educational expenses.  
Health 
As one of the priority sectors in the 
allocation of Special Autonomy Fund, 
health is an exemplary case in the 
utilization of peace dividends in Aceh. In 
2010, Governor Irwandi launched Aceh 
Health Insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan 
Aceh/JKA), a provincial-level health 
insurance scheme for Acehnese. This 
populist program has been praised as one 
of the achievements of Aceh’s local 
government post-conflict. This insurance 
offers a simple process for people to 
access health service and facility. Unlike 
national health insurance that is often 
51 
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criticized of its layered referral system, 
BPJS (Badan Pengelola Jaminan 
Kesehatan/National Health Insurance or 
JKN/Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional/National 
Health Insurance Program), JKA 
beneficiaries are only required to show 
their ID card to access the health service in 
all hospitals in Aceh. In 2010, JKA had 
spent IDR 241 Billion or 15 per cent of the 
Special Autonomy Fund. In 2011, it used 
9.5 per cent of the Special Autonomy 
Fund, and by 2017, IDR 773 Billion of the 
Special Autonomy Fund had been 
disbursed to finance JKA (Putri, 2018). 
Despite the compliment as one of a 
successful program of local government in 
Aceh, JKA under Irwandi administration 
was severely criticized for its lack of 
means-testing. All Acehnese, regardless of 
their economic status and income bracket, 
are eligible to access free health services 
through JKA (Cahyono, 2016). During 
Zaini Abdullah’s governorship, JKA was 
under BPK’s (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/ 
State Audit Agency) scrutiny due to IDR 
63 Billion potential loss. It occurred 
during Zaini Abdullah’s governorship 
because Aceh local government kept 
paying IDR 63 Billion to JKA beneficiaries 
who failed to validate their ID card (Putri, 
2018). 
In sum, from the three sectors of 
the allocated Special Autonomy Fund, 
infrastructure, education and health, the 
fund is primarily disbursed to finance 
small scale projects and populist 
programs. Infrastructure is dominated by 
low quality and small projects that 
cantered around GAM elite and 
contractors, while health and education 
are mostly invested in directing assistance 
in the form of health insurance and 
scholarship. This pattern of fund 
disbursement could be understood from 
the necessity of former GAM combatant to 
create legitimacy and maintain loyalty 
and trust from their beneficiaries through 
the patron-client network. However, as 
will be further elaborated in the next 
section, it leads to difficulty in generating 
performance legitimacy of the former 
combatant in post-conflict long term 
development.  
Post Conflict Economic Challenges: 
Provincial Poverty and Inequality  
Poverty alleviation and equal 
economic development among all districts 
and municipalities are paramount in post-
conflict-economic settlements, as the 
perceived inequality is the major 
contributing factor to the rebellion in 
Aceh. However, ten years after from its 
first disbursement, Special Autonomy 
Fund has yet to significantly contribute to 
poverty alleviation in Aceh as 
demonstrated in the following figures. 
Figure 7. Comparison of Poverty Rate in 
Aceh and National 
 
Source: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau) 
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Figure 8. Comparison of Poverty Rate in 
Aceh and National in Post Conflict 
Period (2006-2018) 
 
Source: BPS (Indonesia Statistical Bureau) 
Figures 7 and 8 tell us about 
poverty, conflict and its aftermath. 
Interestingly, in 2000 the national poverty 
rate was higher than Aceh that might be 
caused by the residual impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis experienced by Indonesia. 
Poverty in Aceh increased significantly in 
2002 after Indonesia stepped into the post-
authoritarian era but placed Aceh in 
security turmoil due to martial and civil 
emergency law. After the 2004 Tsunami 
and the peace agreement, poverty rates in 
Aceh began to demonstrate decreasing 
pattern even though the rate has been 
higher compared to steady declining 
pattern in the national average. However, 
if Aceh is compared to other provinces in 
Indonesia, its poverty rate has placed 
Aceh as the sixth poorest province in 
Indonesia in 2017, after Special Autonomy 
Fund has been allocating for ten years 
since 2008 as shown in following Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Ten Provinces with Highest 
Poverty Rate in Indonesia 2017 
 
Source:  Databoks (2017)  
Table 3 shows us a contradictory 
fact between the amount of provincial 
budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja 
Daerah/APBD or APBA in Aceh) and the 
poverty level. With the highest provincial 
budget derived primarily from Special 
Autonomy Fund, Aceh scored as the 
poorest province on the island of Sumatra.  
Table 3. Provincial Budget and Poverty 
Rates 
Source: AcehTrend (2017) 
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In addition to the provincial 
poverty level, the other problem 
experienced by Aceh in the post conflict is 
the inequality among the districts. The six 
districts with the relatively persistent rate 
of 20 per cent poverty rate are Gayo Lues, 
Aceh Singkil, Bener Meriah, Pidie, Pidie 
Jaya and West Aceh. The tree places with 
the lowest poverty level are all urban area 
with Banda Aceh is the only area with 
single-digit poverty rate and reached 
above the poverty line.   
Three districts with persistently 
high poverty level, Gayo Lues, Bener 
Meriah and Aceh Singkil are resided by 
ethnically heterogeneous areas. Economic 
inequality in these two districts is 
perceived as the trigger of the ALA-ABAS 
partition movement.  ALA and ABAS are 
the movements which aspired to create 
separate province based on Law No 
22/1999 about Decentralization that 
authorizes the creation of new districts, 
often referred to as pemekaran 
(blossoming). ALA consists of Aceh 
central highlands, the district of Aceh 
Tengah, Aceh Tenggara and Aceh Singkil; 
while ABAS is covering areas along 
Aceh’s west coast, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, 
Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat Daya, Simelue, 
and Aceh Selatan. 
Aceh will only repeat history if the 
economic inequality that is a legacy from 
the conflict period is continued during the 
peacetime. During the conflict period, 
Acehnese perceived that they were being 
colonialized by the central government 
due to economic marginalization and the 
exploitation of natural resources; in peace, 
the pattern has re-emerged. The GAM-
dominated government could be seen as 
new “internal colonialism” especially by 
people from ethnically distinct areas that 
are politically disadvantaged and 
experienced persistent poverty during 
and after conflict.  
Patronage Politics and Post-Conflict 
Economic Resources in Aceh 
As has been mentioned in the 
earlier section, the utilization of post-
conflict fund is characterized by a patron-
client network. Although the relationship 
between political elites and their political 
support networks is a central feature in 
any political network, it is particularly 
pronounced in a post-conflict setting 
(Haass & Ottmann, 2017). The 
government elites depend critically on 
their constituencies which provided 
necessary recruits and political and 
material support during conflict while 
during peace times, these constituencies 
form the electorate of the related political 
parties (Haass & Ottmann, 2017). 
Haass and Ottmann describe this 
feature as selective resource allocation in 
political patronage or “a politically 
motivated distribution of selected private 
benefits to relevant constituencies by 
political elites” (Haass & Ottmann, 2017 
pp. 63). The resources can take the form of 
construction of public infrastructure and 
facilities, electrification and road and 
building management. 
According to Aspinall (2009), there 
are three main sources of funds that GAM 
actors have been able to tap: post-conflict 
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"reintegration" funds, post-tsunami 
reconstruction funds, and the 
development budgets of provincial and 
district government.  Thus, it is essential 
to also look at the other two sources of 
fund that create this clientelist economy in 
the post conflict era in Aceh. The 
patronage network had been started in the 
utilization of huge post-tsunami 
reconstruction fund. The former GAM 
members entered this business as a 
material supplier or construction 
contractors through the structure of KPA 
(Komite Peralihan Aceh/Aceh Transitional 
Committee) as an organizational-based of 
GAM mass’ membership (Stange & 
Patock, 2010). 
After winning seats in Aceh’s 
politics, GAM expanded their influences 
in the construction business as contractors 
through KPA network. Since KPA is a 
civil organization, its members cannot be 
banned from joining in bids for 
construction works. However, due to the 
close connection with GAM elites in 
government sectors, contractors from KPA 
knew how to place the right bid and also 
often won the contract (Aspinall, 2009). It 
was helped by the presence of GAM elite 
in BRR, such as Teuku Kamaruzzaman, 
the former GAM negotiator and the head 
of BRR’s executive agency (Aspinall, 
2009).  The leaders of KPA were usually 
awarded the major contract by the 
provincial government, the BRR and 
national government. Two examples were 
the national government project of a major 
bridge in Lhokseumawe and BRR project 
of the construction of metal frames for 
tsunami house in Calang (Aceh West 
Coast), both are valued at approximately 
US$ 2, 2 million that was won by Pulo 
Gadeng Company owned by Muzakkir 
Manaf (Aspinall, 2009).  
The connection between the 
construction business and politics is not 
exclusive to Aceh. The Global Corruption 
Report with Special Focus on Corruption 
in Construction and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction (Transparency 
International, 2005) provides global case 
studies of the nexus between politics and 
business in the construction industry from 
Asia and Africa including India, The 
Philippines, Lesotho, Iraq and in the 
Europe, Italy and Germany.  However, the 
cases in post-conflict areas like Aceh are 
more extreme because of the legacy of 
violent conflict (Klinken & Aspinall, 2011). 
GAM members quickly turned into 
construction contracts, relying on 
influence, patronage, and coercion to 
influence business. 
The next post-conflict fund is 
channeled through the reintegration 
program. Based on MoU’s provision, a 
special provincial agency was established 
in February 2006 to manage the 
reintegration process, namely the Board 
for the Reintegration into Society of 
Former GAM Members, later shortened to 
the Aceh-Peace Reintegration Board or 
BRA. The tasks of BRA covered the 
implementation and monitoring of 
reintegration programs as well as 
coordination with related agencies and 
advisory role to the governor (Governor 
Decree No 330/145/2007). MoU also 
regulates the responsibility for such 
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programs rested with the Indonesian and 
Aceh governments, not international 
donors. From 2005 to 2012, the 
Government of Indonesia through the 
Ministry of Social Affairs has been 
transferring approximately IDR 2 trillion 
(US$ 133 billion) for reintegration 
program through BRA. 
The contribution to the 
reintegration program from provincial 
budget started in 2008, the first year of the 
allocation of the Special Autonomy Fund 
to Aceh. During the period of 2008 to 
2015, the Aceh Provincial Government has 
been disbursing approximately IDR 700 
billion rupiahs (US$ 46 million) for the 
reintegration program. Generally, the type 
of assistance of the reintegration program 
in Aceh could be classified into three 
major categories. The first category is cash 
allowances in the form of diyat (individual 
cash disbursement to former combatant 
households that had lost family 
members). The second category is the 
economic empowerment fund through the 
livelihood program assistance. The last 
type is in-kind assistance that comprises 
of housing settlement and farming land. 
After BRA was officially dismissed 
by Governor Irwandi, in 2013 during 
Zaini Abdullah’s governorship, there was 
an attempt to maintain the existence of 
reintegration institution through the 
establishment of BP2A (Badan Penguatan 
Perdamaian Aceh/Aceh Peace 
Strengthening Board). The advocates of 
the establishment of BP2A based their 
argument on the unfinished reintegration 
programs such as land farming allocation, 
housing and cash allowance and urged by 
the mandate of the reintegration process 
in MoU Helsinki. On the contrary, the 
opponents opposed the establishment of 
BP2A or any other ad hoc reintegration 
institution, instead preferring to hand 
over reintegration process to related 
SKPA (Satuan Kerja Pelaksana Aceh/Aceh 
Government Work Unit) for efficiency and 
transparency. SKPA (or SKPD in district 
level) is the provincial unit or regional 
office of national ministries. For example, 
the disbursement of cash allowance for 
conflict victims could be channeled 
through the regional office of social 
services and the allocation of land farming 
could be coordinated under the regional 
land agency. 
The preference of individual cash 
disbursement indicates the patron-client 
relationship in the reintegration program, 
as personal loyalty is easier to guarantee 
than through community-based loyalty. 
BRA as an ad hoc institution is prone to be 
exploited by the ruling government as 
their political vehicle, especially in a 
political setting where the former 
combatants won the election and hold the 
political power. The reintegration fund for 
their fellow former combatants is easily 
manipulated or mismanaged to gain more 
control or political support as a cash 
disbursement program is a lucrative 
aspect in political competition. 
The third source of funding in 
Aceh’s post conflict era is the ordinary 
development budget in the form of 
Special Autonomy Fund. Barron and 
Clark note that "special autonomy boosted 
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natural resource revenues kept within 
Aceh by more than 150 times, from IDR 26 
billion (US$2.7 million) in 1999 (or 1.4 
percent of total revenue) to IDR 4 trillion 
(US$421 million) in 2004 (40 percent) 
(Aspinall, 2014). 
The increase in regional budget, 
including the one received by Aceh 
constitutes a huge injection of resources 
for predatory captures and patronage, 
particularly for GAM members and the 
supporters who have moved into 
government as well as their business and 
political allies (Aspinall, 2014). This 
patronage has taken form in direct 
budgetary transfers. In 2013, for example, 
the provincial budget includes grants of 
IDR 127,5 billion (approximately US$ 125 
million) to the Aceh Transitional Agency 
(Komite Peralihan Aceh) the organization 
representing former combatant (Aspinall, 
2014). 
In the subsequent years, the 
amount of grant gradually decreased to 
IDR 80 million in 2014 and IDR 61 billion 
in 2017. Although the trends show the 
declining patters, the continuity of this 
grant indicates the entrenched patronage 
in the post-conflict era in Aceh. It is 
important to note that the provincial 
budget receives the biggest share from the 
special autonomy fund, exceeding other 
income items such as Local Own-Source 
Revenue or Additional Revenue Sharing 
from Oil and Gas. 
Another striking feature in the 
utilization of the Special Autonomy Fund 
in Aceh is the disproportionate use of 
funds. The problem of a massive 
percentage of small value projects in 
infrastructure and education that is 
mentioned in the previous section is 
depicted in provincial and district/city 
data of the all priorities sectors of Special 
Autonomy Fund as shown in Figures 10 
and 11. 
Figure 10. The Utilization of SAF based 
on Value of the Project in Provincial 
Level 2014 
 
Source: Bappeda Aceh (2015, n.d) 
 
Figure 11. The Utilization of SAF based 
on Value of the Project in District/City 
Level 2014 
 
Source: Bappeda Aceh (2015, n.d) 
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Small-value projects have been 
creating a problem for monitoring and 
evaluation programs. These projects are 
mostly implemented by direct 
appointment and could be executed 
without undergoing supervision and the 
monitoring system by LKPP (Lembaga 
Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang Jasa 
Pemerintah/ National Public Procurement 
Agency). Due to the domination of GAM 
in local government as a result of their 
victory in local elections, these small 
projects could easily be awarded to fellow 
GAM contractors and sustain the patron-
client based economy. 
The most current case of the 
mismanagement of the Special Autonomy 
Fund is the arrest of incumbent Governor 
Irwandi in July 2018 by KPK (Korupsi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi/Corruption 
Eradication Commission) due to 
allegation of taking illegal fee for 
development projects funded by special 
autonomy fund (Diela, 2018). Irwandi was 
accused to corrupt IDR 500 Million (USD 
33,000), a relatively low amount compared 
to other corruption cases in Indonesia. 
However, Governor Irwandi arrest is the 
first high profile corruption case in Aceh 
after the peace agreement. The last case 
involving government official in Aceh was 
in 2004 when the former governor of 
Aceh, Abdullah Puteh was sentenced for 
10 years due to marking up the price of 
the purchase of helicopter that caused IDR 
2 Billion (USD 133,000) state financial loss. 
This “belated” KPK intervention could 
indicate the careful consideration of the 
national government to maintain the 
stability of the early phase of peace 
building in Aceh, even though it cost a 
delayed good governance aspect.  
Aspinall (2009) argues that GAM 
members and supporters have instead 
mostly been reintegrated into Aceh's 
political economy by way of predatory 
and clientelist patterns of economic 
behavior that seek to extract rents from 
the state. The reconstruction and 
reintegration funds had been utilized to 
create the patronage network in the post-
conflict era and this practice is sustained 
in peace time through the disbursement of 
Special Autonomy Fund, that could 
indicate the long-term economic 
predatory behavior during the peace 
building phase in Aceh.  
Conclusion  
Economic factors were the major 
grievances that triggered a rebellion in 
Aceh. Grievances over the inequalities of 
distribution of natural resources have 
been a powerful narrative in mobilizing 
discontent during GAM insurgencies. The 
conditions have been worsened by the 
armed conflict, leaving Aceh as one of 
poorest provinces in Indonesia with low 
investment and high economic costs 
caused by illegal taxes by GAM and poor 
infrastructure due to the damaging impact 
of the conflict. The primary effort from the 
central government to alleviate economic 
grievances in Aceh was initiated in 2008, 
by a Special Autonomy Fund as a 
development fund. The government of 
Aceh channeled the fund according to the 
provisions in LoGA which gives the 
biggest share for infrastructure, education 
and health. Infrastructure has been 
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criticized for its low quality, the lengthy 
process, and the focus on small projects 
that gives insignificant impact on people’s 
welfare and economic development. 
While showing a positive impact, 
health and education sectors also suffer 
several shortcomings in the planning and 
implementation.  The inequality of 
economic development within districts 
and municipalities in Aceh is also 
becoming a concern. To some extent, 
infrastructure, health and education 
programs contributed to the short-term 
legitimacy of GAM due to their populist 
character and the patron-client network. 
Particularly on the small-scale project, 
these practices indicate the continuation 
and maintenance of patron-client 
economic network among GAM circle that 
was initiated in the post-tsunami 
reconstruction industry and reintegration 
program. 
Aceh’s first post-conflict 
administration demonstrated an ability to 
identify policy targets of the disbursement 
of the Special Autonomy Fund but not an 
ability to formulate concrete strategies 
designed to meet those targets and a lack 
of capacity in implementation. Another 
shortcoming is state capacity in 
translating development plans into 
comprehensive programs. They lack the 
long-term vision to channel the peace 
dividend into inclusive growth and 
investment projects which can stimulate 
future economic welfare and justice. 
It partially resulted from a lack of 
capacity building of the Aceh local 
bureaucrats dominated by former GAM 
members. Various kinds of peace 
dividends in Aceh had successfully 
integrated former combatants into post-
conflict economic development and 
peacebuilding at large, but the 
participation and integration will not be 
sufficient to maintain peace: there is also 
an urgent need of building and enhancing 
capacity. The economic settlement in post-
conflict peacebuilding in Aceh is 
characterized by the establishment of an 
institution with patronage practices and 
limited participation in economic 
development. Given the fact that 
grievance over economic inequality has 
been the main driver of insurgency in 
Aceh, the incompetence of the new 
government in delivering services, 
stimulating inclusive growth and equal 
development among regions in Aceh can 
potentially harm the durability of peace. 
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